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Summary. We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count sat-
isfies Maskin monotonicity. The basic concept is the notion of a “cyclic permutation
domain” which arises by fixing one particular ordering of alternatives and including
all its cyclic permutations. The cyclic permutation domains are exactly the maximal
domains on which the Borda count is strategy-proof when combined with every pos-
sible tie breaking rule. It turns out that the Borda count is monotonic on a larger
class of domains. We show that the maximal domains on which the Borda count sat-
isfies Maskin monotonicity are the “cyclically nested permutation domains” which are
obtained from the cyclic permutation domains in an appropriately specified recursive
way.
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1 Introduction
A social choice correspondence satisfies Maskin monotonicity if and only if a chosen
alternative remains a possible choice whenever in no individual’s ranking its relative
position to another alternative decreases. It is well-known that Maskin monotonicity,
which we shall henceforth refer to simply as “monotonicity,” is a necessary condition for
Nash implementability; moreover, combined with a no veto power condition it is also
sufficient provided that there are at least three individuals (Maskin (1999/1977)). In
this paper, we characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies
monotonicity. Since the Borda count satisfies the no veto power condition whenever
there are sufficiently many voters, the result thus also yields the preference domains
on which the Borda count is Nash implementable.
The celebrated Muller-Satterthwaite theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite (1977))
establishes that, for social choice functions (i.e. single-valued social choice correspon-
dences), monotonicity is equivalent to strategy-proofness, provided that all preference
profiles are admissible. By contrast, while strategy-proofness always implies mono-
tonicity, the converse need not be true on restricted domains. In fact, the main result
of the present paper provides an illustration of this, showing that there exist preference
domains on which the Borda count is monotonic but not strategy-proof when combined
with a tie breaking rule.
The preference domains on which the Borda count (with tie breaking) is strategy-
proof have been characterized in the companion paper Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di
(2006). There, we have shown that, if all individuals face the same domain restriction,
the maximal strategy-proof domains for the Borda count are obtained by fixing one
particular ordering of the alternatives and including all its cyclic permutations. We
refer to such domains as cyclic permutation domains. Here, we show that monotonicity
of the Borda count imposes weaker restrictions and allows one to construct domains on
which possibility results emerge in a recursive way from the cyclic permutation domains.
The corresponding domains are referred to as cyclically nested permutation domains.
Specifically, we prove that, under a mild richness condition, the cyclically nested per-
mutation domains are exactly the domains on which the Borda count is monotonic,
maintaining the assumption that all individuals face the same domain restriction.
Cyclically nested permutation domains have a more complicated structure than the
cyclic permutation domains from which they are recursively constructed. This is the
price to be paid when moving from the stronger condition of strategy-proofness to the
less demanding condition of monotonicity. In the context of the Borda count, however,
monotonicity is a particulary appealing condition since it can be defined in a natural
way for social choice correspondences. By contrast, the standard definition of strategy-
proofness requires a social choice function. Thus, in order to analyze strategy-proofness,
the Borda count has first to be transformed into a social choice function using a tie
breaking rule.1
Cyclic permutation domains as well as their nested refinements are “small” in the
sense that each such domain consists of only as many preference orderings as there
are alternatives. More specifically, these domains have the restrictive property that
1In Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di (2006), we show that in fact some results do depend on the way
ties are broken. Strictly speaking, the above mentioned characterization result asserts that the Borda
count is strategy-proof for every tie breaking rule if and only if the underlying domain is a cyclic
permutation domain.
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for each alternative and each rank there exists exactly one preference ordering in the
domain that has the given alternative at the given rank in the ordering (see Lemma 2.1
below). Our main characterization result can thus be viewed as the negative finding
that the Borda count can be monotonic only on small domains with a very special
additional structure.
There is a large literature on domain restrictions in social choice (see Gaertner
(2001) for a state-of-the-art summary). Most contributions in this area, however, have
studied majority voting and its generalizations, taking Black’s (1948) seminal contri-
bution on the notion of single-peaked preferences as the starting point. Some papers,
such as Kalai and Muller (1977) and Kalai and Ritz (1980), have analyzed abstract
Arrovian aggregation on restricted domains and obtained characterizations of those do-
mains that admit possibility results. As mentioned above, Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di
(2006) obtained a characterization of the maximal domains on which the Borda count
is strategy-proof. In a similar vein, Sanver (2007b) characterized the domains on which
the plurality rule is strategy-proof, finding that only “trivial” preference domains qual-
ify.
The closest relatives in the literature to the present paper are Bochet and Storcken
(2005) and Sanver (2007a). Sanver (2007a) investigates monotonicity of the plurality
rule on restricted domains in a model similar to the one used here and shows that
the plurality rule can be monotonic only in trivial cases. To the best of our knowl-
edge, Bochet and Storcken (2005) is the first paper to study Maskin monotonicity on
restricted preference domains in the framework of the abstract social choice model.2
These authors analyze both maximal strategy-proof and maximal monotonic domains
for general social choice functions. However, unlike Sanver (2007a) and the present
paper in which every individual faces the same preference restriction, Bochet and Stor-
cken (2005) consider restrictions of the preference domain of exactly one individual.
By consequence, the social choice functions found to satisfy the desired properties of
strategy-proofness and monotonicity have a very special hierarchical structure and are
in fact “almost” dictatorial.
2 Basic Definitions and Statement of Main Result
Let X be a finite universe of social states or social alternatives and let q ≥ 2 be its
cardinality. By PX we denote the set of all strict linear orderings (irreflexive, transitive
and total binary relations) on X; for simplicity, we will henceforth simply speak of
linear orderings, dropping the “strict” qualification. By P ⊆ PX we denote a generic
subdomain of the unrestricted domain PX .
Definition (Social choice rule) A mapping f :
⋃∞
n=1 Pn → 2X \ {∅} that assigns a
set of (most preferred) alternatives f(1, ...,n) ∈ 2X \ {∅} to each n-tuple of linear
orderings and all n is called a social choice rule (SCR).
Let rk[x,] denote the rank of alternative x in the ordering  (i.e. rk[x,] = 1 if x is
2There is also a more distantly related literature on monotonic extensions of social choice rules.
For instance, the work of Erdem and Sanver (2005) is also motivated by the observation that the
Borda count, and in fact any scoring method, violates the monotonicity condition on an unrestricted
domain. However, the monotonic extensions are again defined on the unrestricted preference domain;
therefore, the analysis does not contribute to the question on which preference domains the original
(non-extended) social rule would satisfy monotonicity.
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the top alternative in the ranking , rk[x,] = 2 if x is second-best, and so on).
Definition (Borda count) The SCR fB associated with the Borda count is given as
follows: for all n and all 1, . . . ,n∈ PX we have
x ∈ fB(1, . . . ,n)⇔
n∑
i=1
rk[x,i] ≤
n∑
i=1
rk[y,i] for all y ∈ X.
We shall denote by L(x,) = {y ∈ X | x  y} the lower contour set and by U(x,) =
{y ∈ X | y  x} the upper contour set of the preference  at the alternative x ∈ X. A
SCR f is called monotonic on P if for all x ∈ X, all n and all 1, . . . ,n, ′1 . . . ,′n∈ P
we have
[x ∈ f(1, ...,n), L(x,i) ⊆ L(x,′i) for all i = 1, ..., n] ⇒ x ∈ f(′1, ...,′n).
We call a domain P Borda monotonic if fB is monotonic on P. Note that any sub-
domain of a (Borda) monotonic domain is (Borda) monotonic. Given a profile of
preferences (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn, we say that alternatives A ⊆ X are indifferent on the
top if A = fB(1, ...,n).
We will only be interested in preference domains that are minimally rich since without
such condition properties such as monotonicity or strategy-proofness can be satisfied
in a trivial way.3 Specifically, we will impose the following condition.
Definition (Minimally rich domain) A domain P is called minimally rich if, for
any x ∈ X, there exists (i) ∈ P such that rk[x,] = 1, and (ii) ′∈ P such that
rk[x,′] = q.
Thus, our minimal richness condition requires that each alternative must be (i) most
preferred by at least one preference ordering, and (ii) least preferred by some (other)
preference ordering. This is slightly stronger than the richness condition used in Bar-
bie, Puppe and Tasna´di (2006) which consisted of part (i) only.4 Part (ii) of the present
condition is needed in Lemma 5.3 and in Substep 2B of the proof of our main result
below.
Cyclically nested permutation domains
An ordering ′ is called a cyclic permutation of  if ′ can be obtained from  by
sequentially shifting the bottom element to the top while leaving the order between
all other alternatives unchanged. Thus, for instance, the cyclic permutations of the
ordering abcd are dabc, cdab and bcda. The set of all cyclic permutations of a fixed
ordering  is denoted by Z(), which we also call a cyclic permutation domain. In
Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di (2006), we have shown that the cyclic permutation domains
are exactly the domains on which the Borda count is strategy-proof when combined
with any conceivable deterministic tie-breaking rule.5 The cyclic permutation domains
serve as the building blocks of the so-called “cyclically nested permutation domains”
3Obviously, every social choice function (i.e. single-valued social choice rule) is strategy-proof and
monotonic on any domain consisting of only one preference ordering.
4Although even weaker than the “minimal” richness condition used here, the condition in Barbie,
Puppe and Tasna´di (2006) is simply called “richness” there.
5Combined with particular, appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules the Borda count can be
strategy-proof on a larger class of domains, see Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di (2006).
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to be defined presently. The following is our main result.
Theorem A domain is minimally rich and Borda monotonic if and only if it is a
cyclically nested permutation domain.
Before giving a formal definition of cyclically nested permutation (henceforth, CNP)
domains, we start with an intuitive example illustrating the basic recursive construction
of CNP domains. A CNP domain on q alternatives consists of q preferences and can
therefore be represented by a matrix that collects the preferences in its columns with
the best alternative in the first row, the second-best alternative in the second row, and
so on. For instance, the matrix in Table 1 represents a cyclic permutation domain on
a set of three alternatives.
Table 1: Initial step a b cb c a
c a b

We may now replace the elements of the matrix with different square matrices
representing cyclical permutation domains of identical size. For instance, in Table 1
we may replace each element with a 2× 2 matrix to obtain the matrix shown in Table
2. Thus, we have constructed a new CNP domain on a set of six alternatives. This
procedure can repeated any finite number of times, replacing at each step the elements
of the given matrix with square matrices of identical size storing different cyclical
permutation domains. However, in order to remain within the class of admissible CNP
domains, the “replacement mechanism” has to be further restricted, as explained below.
Table 2: A new CNP domain
d e f g h i
e d g f i h
f g h i d e
g f i h e d
h i d e f g
i h e d g f

Let us then turn to the formal definition of CNP domains. First, the cyclic per-
mutation domains themselves are called CNP domains of depth 1. Second, we define
CNP domains of depth 2, as follows. Assume that q = q1q2, where q1, q2 are two in-
tegers greater than 1. Take an arbitrary partition X1, . . . , Xq2 of X into equally sized
sets (i.e., #Xi = q1 for all i = 1, . . . , q2) and let X
′ = {X1, . . . , Xq2}. Pick a linear
ordering ′∈ PX′ and consider the domain Z(′). We now replace each set Xi with
a cyclic permutation domain defined on the set of alternatives Xi with cardinality q1.
For example, if q2 = 3 and q1 = 2, we first obtain the domain at the left hand side
of Table 3 and thereafter the domain at the right hand side of this table. Note that
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Table 3: Constructing CNP domains
′1 ′2 ′3
X1 X2 X3
X2 X3 X1
X3 X1 X2
1 2 3 4 5 6
x1 x2 y2 y1 z2 z1
x2 x1 y1 y2 z1 z2
y1 y2 z2 z1 x1 x2
y2 y1 z1 z2 x2 x1
z1 z2 x1 x2 y1 y2
z2 z1 x2 x1 y2 y1
each factorization of q into two factors results in different CNP domains of depth 2;
moreover, the order of the factors obviously also matters.
To formalize the “replacement” mechanism indicated in Table 3, pick arbitrary
linear orderings ∗1∈ PX1 , . . . ,∗q2∈ PXq2 . For each linear ordering ′′∈ Z(′) on
X ′ we can construct a set of preferences P ′ = {′′1 , . . . ,′′q1} on X such that (i){′′1 |Xi , . . . ,′′q1 |Xi} = Z(
∗
i ), where ′′k |Xi denotes the restriction of ′′k to Xi, and
(ii) Xi ′′ Xj implies x ′′k y for all i, j = 1, ..., q2, all x ∈ Xi, all y ∈ Xj and all
k = 1, . . . , q1. Observe that by construction any CNP domain of depth 2 on X consists
of exactly q = #X preferences.
However, in order to guarantee monotonicity of the Borda count, we must restrict
the admissible replacements by cyclical permutation domains. To see this consider the
domain shown in Table 4. Pick a profile Π consisting of one voter of each type. Then
fB(Π) = {x1, x2, y1, y2, z1, z2} and monotonicity is violated at alternative x2 if, for
instance, the voter of type 3 switches to type 6. Indeed, while x2 improves by two
ranks if the the voter of type 3 switches to type 6, the alternative z1 even improves
by three ranks and in fact becomes the unique Borda winner.
Table 4: A non-monotonic domain
1 2 3 4 5 6
x1 x2 y2 y1 z2 z1
x2 x1 y1 y2 z1 z2
y1 y2 z2 z1 x2 x1
y2 y1 z1 z2 x1 x2
z1 z2 x1 x2 y1 y2
z2 z1 x2 x1 y2 y1
We restrict the admissible replacements by cyclical permutation domains by speci-
fying a set of ordered pairs (x, y) of alternatives that must have the same rank difference
in all preference orderings that rank x above y. For example, in Table 3 the rank differ-
ences between x1 and y1 is 2 in all those preferences that rank x1 above y1; similarly,
the rank difference between x1 and z1 is 4 in all preference orderings that rank x1
above z1. By contrast, in preference 5 the alternative z1 is one rank above x1, while
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it is 3 ranks above in 6.6 Formally, for a domain to qualify as a CNP domain there
must exist, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , q2} with i 6= j, bijections ϕi,j : Xi → Xj such that,
for all x ∈ Xi, the rank difference between x and ϕi,j(x) is the same in all preference
orderings that rank x above ϕi,j(x). To illustrate, consider again the CNP domain on
the right hand side of Table 3. As is easily verified the required bijections exist in that
case; for instance, ϕ1,3(x1) = z1, ϕ1,3(x2) = z2, ϕ3,1(z1) = x2 and ϕ3,1(z2) = x1.
7 By
contrast, for the domain shown in Table 4 there exists no bijection with the required
properties between the sets X3 = {z1, z2} and X1 = {x1, x2}, for instance.
Now assume that we have defined all CNP domains of depth n−1 and let q = ∏ni=1 qi
where q1, . . . , qn are integers greater than 1. The class of CNP domains of depth n is
defined as follows. Take an arbitrary partition X1, . . . , Xqn of X into equally sized sets
(i.e., q′ = #Xi = q/qn for all i = 1, . . . qn) and let X ′ = {X1, . . . , Xqn}. Pick arbitrary
CNP domains P1 ⊆ PX1 , . . . ,Pqn ⊆ PXqn with the associated factorization
∏n−1
i=1 qi,
a linear ordering ′∈ PX′ , and consider the domain Z(′). For each linear ordering
′′∈ Z(′) on X ′ construct a set of preferences P ′ = {′′1 , . . . ,′′q′} on X such that
(i) {′′1 |Xi , . . . ,′′q′ |Xi} = Pi, (ii) Xi 
′′ Xj implies x ′′k y for all i, j = 1, ..., qn, all
x ∈ Xi, all y ∈ Xj and all k = 1, . . . , q′, and (iii) there exist, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , qn}
with i 6= j, bijections ϕi,j : Xi → Xj such that, for all x ∈ Xi, x and ϕi,j(x) have the
same rank differences in all preferences of the form ′′k that rank x above ϕi,j(x), for
all ′′∈ Z(′) and all k.
Observe that, by construction, any CNP domain on X consists of exactly q = #X
preferences. Furthermore, one can easily determine the maximal depth of a CNP do-
main on a given number of alternatives, as follows. Suppose that the prime factorization
of q takes the form q =
∏k
i=1 p
mi
i , where pi are primes and mi are positive integers for
all i = 1, . . . , k; moreover, let Dq :=
∑k
i=1mi. Then, the maximal depth of a CNP do-
main on q alternatives is Dq. In particular, if q is a prime, only the cyclic permutation
domains themselves qualify as CNP domains.
We provide an example of a CNP of depth 3 with q1 = 2, q2 = 3 and q3 = 2
to further illustrate the definition of CNP domains. The first domain is a cyclical
permutation domain defined on two sets of alternatives as shown in Table 5. Let
Table 5: Initial step
′′1 ′′2
X ′′1 X
′′
2
X ′′2 X
′′
1
X ′′1 = {x1, x2, . . . , x6}, X ′′2 = {x7, x8, . . . , x12}, ϕ1,2(xi) = xi+6 for i = 1, . . . , 6, and
ϕ2,1 = ϕ
−1
1,2. Next, we replace each set X
′′
1 and X
′′
2 with a CNP domain of depth 2 and
associated factorization 2·3. We derive these two CNP domains simultaneously in Table
6. Furthermore, we select the partition X ′1 = {x1, x2}, X ′2 = {x3, x4}, X ′3 = {x5, x6}
of X ′′1 and the partition X
′
4 = {x7, x8}, X ′5 = {x9, x10}, X ′6 = {x11, x12} of X ′′2 .
6Note that this can happen only across different sets Xi and Xj ; indeed, within the sets Xi, and
generally in any cyclical permutation domain, two alternatives that have the same relative position in
two different preference orderings must also have the same rank difference.
7Note, in particular, that we do not necessarily require ϕi,j = ϕ
−1
j,i .
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Table 6: Constructing the CNP domains on X ′′1 and X
′′
2
′1 ′2 ′3
X ′1 X
′
2 X
′
3
X ′2 X
′
3 X
′
1
X ′3 X
′
1 X
′
2
′4 ′5 ′6
X ′4 X
′
5 X
′
6
X ′5 X
′
6 X
′
4
X ′6 X
′
4 X
′
5
The sets X ′1, . . . , X
′
6 are then replaced by cyclical permutation domains each defined
on the respective sets of two alternatives. Specifically, we replace Xi by Z (x2i−1  x2i)
for all i = 1, . . . , 6, and we choose bijections such that ϕ′1,2(x1) = x3, ϕ
′
1,2(x2) = x4,
ϕ′1,3(x1) = x5, ϕ
′
1,3(x2) = x6, ϕ
′
2,3(x3) = x5, ϕ
′
2,3(x4) = x6, ϕ
′
2,1 =
(
ϕ′1,2
)−1
, ϕ′3,1 =(
ϕ′1,3
)−1
, ϕ′3,2 =
(
ϕ′2,3
)−1
. We thus obtain the CNP domain shown at the left hand
side of Table 7. In an analogous way, we construct the CNP domain shown at the right
hand side of Table 7. Finally, inserting the two CNP domains of Table 7 into Table
5 and employing the bijections ϕ1,2 and ϕ2,1, we obtain the CNP domain of depth 3
shown in Table 8.
Table 7: The CNP domains on X ′′1 and X
′′
2
∗1 ∗2 ∗3 ∗4 ∗5 ∗6
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
x2 x1 x4 x3 x6 x5
x3 x4 x5 x6 x1 x2
x4 x3 x6 x5 x2 x1
x5 x6 x1 x2 x3 x4
x6 x5 x2 x1 x4 x3
∗7 ∗8 ∗9 ∗10 ∗11 ∗12
x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12
x8 x7 x10 x9 x12 x11
x9 x10 x11 x12 x7 x8
x10 x9 x12 x11 x8 x7
x11 x12 x7 x8 x9 x10
x12 x11 x8 x7 x10 x9
We conclude this section with a simple necessary condition for a domain to qualify
as a CNP domain.
Lemma 2.1 Any CNP domain P on X consists of exactly q preferences, and for
all x ∈ X and all i ∈ {1, . . . , q} there exists exactly one preference ∈ P such that
rk [x,] = i.
Proof of Lemma 2.1 The statement can be established by induction on the depth of
CNP domains. Cyclical permutation domains clearly satisfy the stated property. As-
sume that the statement holds for all CNP domains of depth n − 1. Take a CNP
domain P of depth n that is constructed from a cyclical permutation domain on
X ′ = {X1, . . . , Xqn} (where the Xi are sets of equal size) and from CNP domains
of depth n − 1 replacing each set Xi. The stated property follows at once from the
induction hypothesis for the CNP domains of depth n−1 and the structure of a cyclical
permutation domain.
Note that, while any subdomain of a CNP domain is Borda monotonic, no proper
subdomain of a CNP domain can be minimally rich by Lemma 2.1. Moreover, we have
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Table 8: A CNP domain of depth 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12
x2 x1 x4 x3 x6 x5 x8 x7 x10 x9 x12 x11
x3 x4 x5 x6 x1 x2 x9 x10 x11 x12 x7 x8
x4 x3 x6 x5 x2 x1 x10 x9 x12 x11 x8 x7
x5 x6 x1 x2 x3 x4 x11 x12 x7 x8 x9 x10
x6 x5 x2 x1 x4 x3 x12 x11 x8 x7 x10 x9
x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
x8 x7 x10 x9 x12 x11 x2 x1 x4 x3 x6 x5
x9 x10 x11 x12 x7 x8 x3 x4 x5 x6 x1 x2
x10 x9 x12 x11 x8 x7 x4 x3 x6 x5 x2 x1
x11 x12 x7 x8 x9 x10 x5 x6 x1 x2 x3 x4
x12 x11 x8 x7 x10 x9 x6 x5 x2 x1 x4 x3
the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If P = {1, . . . ,q} is a CNP domain on X, then fB(1, . . . ,q) = X,
i.e. all alternatives are indifferent on the top if each preference occurs exactly once in
a profile.
3 Characterizing and Detecting CNP Domains
We characterized cyclical permutation domains in Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di (2006)
by the equal rank difference condition, which we recall here for minimally rich domains.
Definition (Equal rank difference) A minimally rich domain P satisfies the equal
rank difference (henceforth, ERD) condition if for all x, y ∈ X, all ,′∈ P
(x  y and x ′ y) ⇒ rk[x,]− rk[y,] = rk[x,′]− rk[y,′].
Considering the restricted rank difference condition associated with the bijections ϕi,j :
Xi → Xj in the recursive definition of CNP domains, an appropriate weakening of the
ERD condition leads to a characterization of CNP domains.
Definition (Nested equal rank difference) A domain P satisfies the nested equal
rank difference (henceforth, NERD) condition if there exists a “nested” set system
{X,Xin , Xin−1,in , . . . , Xi2,...,in−1,in , Xi1,i2,...,in−1,in}qn,...,q1in=1,...,i1=1
on X such that
1. q =
∏n
i=1 qi, where qi are integers greater than 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n;
2. X = ∪qni=1Xi, #Xi = q/qn for all i = 1, . . . , qn;
(a) for all ∈ P, all x ∈ Xi and all y ∈ Xj we have that x  y implies x′  y′
for all x′ ∈ Xi and all y′ ∈ Xj ;
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(b) there exist bijections ϕni,j : Xi → Xj for all i, j = 1, . . . , qn, i 6= j such that
x  y = ϕni,j(x) and x ′ y ⇒ rk[x,]− rk[y,] = rk[x,′]− rk[y,′]
for all x ∈ Xi and all ,′∈ P;
3. for all l = 2, . . . , n and all (il, il+1, . . . , in) ∈ ×nk=l{1, . . . , qk} we have
(a) Xil,il+1,...,in−1,in = ∪ql−1il−1=1Xil−1,il,...,in−1,in ,
#Xil−1,il,...,in−1,in =
∏l−2
k=1 qk for all il−1 = 1, . . . , ql−1;
(b) for all ∈ P, all i, j = 1, . . . , ql−1, i 6= j, all x ∈ Xi,il,...,in−1,in and all y ∈
Xj,il,...,in−1,in we have that x  y implies x′  y′ for all x′ ∈ Xi,il,...,in−1,in
and y′ ∈ Xj,il,...,in−1,in ;
(c) there exists bijections ϕl−1i,j : Xi,il,...,in−1,in → Xj,il,...,in−1,in for all i, j =
1, . . . , ql−1, i 6= j such that
x  y = ϕl−1i,j (x) and x ′ y ⇒ rk[x,]− rk[y,] = rk[x,′]− rk[y,′]
for all x ∈ Xi,il,...,in−1,in and all ,′∈ P.
Observe that a minimally rich domain P satisfies ERD if and only if it satisfies
NERD on the nested set system {X, {x1}, {x2}, . . . , {xq}}. Thus, ERD is a special
case of NERD.
Proposition 1 P is a CNP domain if and only if P is minimally rich and satisfies
NERD.
Proof Assume that P is a CNP domain. We prove that P satisfies NERD by induction
on the depth of CNP domains. By the analysis of Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di (2006),
cyclic permutation domains satisfy ERD. Thus, suppose that all CNP domains of
depth n−1 satisfy NERD. Pick a CNP domain P on X of depth n with the associated
factorization q =
∏n
k=1 qk, which already determines the factors for Point 1 in the
definition of NERD. By the definition of CNP domains one obtains P from a cyclical
permutation domain on X ′ = {X1, . . . , Xqn}, where the sets of X ′ partition X into
qn equally sized sets. These qn sets deliver us the single indexed sets of the required
nested set system. It follows from the replacement mechanism of the definition of
CNP domains that any preference in P ranks either any alternative from Xi ∈ X ′
higher than any alternative from Xj ∈ X ′, or any alternative from Xi ∈ X ′ lower than
any alternative from Xj ∈ X ′; this guarantees Point 2(a) of the NERD conditions.
Moreover, each set Xi ∈ X ′ has to be replaced with a CNP domain on Xi with the
associated factorization
∏n−1
k=1 qk such that for fixed bijections ϕi,j : Xi → Xj we
have that x ∈ Xi and ϕi,j(x) maintain their rank differences for all x ∈ Xi whenever
x is ranked above ϕi,j(x), which ensures Point 2(b) of the definition of NERD. By
employing the induction hypothesis, NERD is satisfied by all CNP domains of depth
n− 1 on Xi ∈ X ′. Thus, there exist nested set systems
{Xi, Xin−1,i, . . . , Xi2,...,in−1,i, Xi1,i2,...,in−1,i}qn−1,...,q1in−1=1,...,i1=1
on Xi such that any CNP domain on Xi ∈ X ′ satisfies Points 1-3 of the definition of
NERD for all i = 1, . . . , qn. Taking the union of these qn nested set systems and X,
we obtain the required nested set system for the domain P.
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To prove the converse statement take a minimally rich domain P satisfying NERD.
We show that P is a CNP domain by induction on n in the definition of NERD. For
n = 1, NERD boils down to ERD, and therefore P is a cyclic permutation domain
by Barbie, Puppe and Tasna´di (2006). Assume that a minimally rich domain P is a
CNP domain if it satisfies NERD with n − 1, and consider a minimally rich domain
P satisfying NERD for a nested set system with n indices. Point 1 in the definition
of NERD delivers us the associated factorization of P and Point 2 determines the
appropriate partition X ′ = {X1, . . . , Xqn} of X. Define the domain P ′ ⊆ PX′ by
requiring for all ′∈ P ′ that
Y1 ′ . . . ′ Yqn ⇐⇒ ∃ ∈ P,∀y1 ∈ Y1, . . . ,∀yqn ∈ Yqn , y1  . . .  yqn ,
where Yi ∈ X ′ for all i = 1, . . . , qn and ∪qni=1Yi = X. Observe that if there exists
y1 ∈ Y1, . . . , yqn ∈ Yqn such that y1  . . .  yqn , then we must have y′1  . . .  y′qn
for all y′1 ∈ Y1, . . . , y′qn ∈ Yqn by Point 2(a). Moreover, the non-emptyness of P implies
the non-emptiness of P ′. Since by Point 2(b) there exist bijections ϕni,j : Yi → Yj such
that for all y ∈ Yi and all ,′∈ P if y  z = ϕni,j(y) and y ′ z, then
dy,z = rk [y,]− rk [z,] = rk [y,′]− rk [z,′] ,
we must have by the definition of P ′ that
dy,z
q/qn
= rk [Yi,∗]− rk [Yj ,∗] = rk [Yi,∗∗]− rk [Yj ,∗∗]
whenever Yi ∗ Yj and Yi ∗∗ Yj , where y ∈ Yi and z = ϕni,j(y). Hence, P ′ satisfies
ERD, and from the minimal richness condition it follows that P ′ ⊆ PX′ has to be a
cyclic permutation domain. Moreover, by Point 3 the distinct nested set systems
{Xi, Xin−1,i, . . . , Xi2,...,in−1,i, Xi1,i2,...,in−1,i}qn−1,...,q1in−1=1,...,i1=1
satisfy NERD for all i = 1, . . . , qn with the same associated factorization
∏n−1
k=1 qk. This
means by the induction hypothesis that Pi ⊆ PXi form CNP domains with associated
factorizations
∏n−1
k=1 qk for all i = 1, . . . , qn. Finally, Point 2 in the definition of NERD
assures that P has to be obtained from the CNP domains on Xi in line with the
replacement mechanism specified in the definition of CNP domains, which completes
the proof of Proposition 1.
Now we outline a procedure deciding whether a given domain P on X is a CNP
domain.
1. If #X 6= #P, then P is not a CNP domain.
2. Pick a preference 1∈ P and label the alternatives so that rk [xi,1] = i. Next,
label the remaining preferences so that rk [x1,i] = i. If this cannot be done,
then P cannot be a CNP domain by Lemma 2.1.
3. Step 3 aims to determine the associated factorization of P. Let r = min{i ∈
{2, . . . , q} | rk [xi,2] = 1}, n = 1, q1 = r.
(a) We have determined the associated factorization if r = q.
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(b) If r is not a divisor of q, then P cannot be a CNP domain.
(c) If r is a proper divisor of q, then let s = min{i ∈ {2r, 3r, . . . , q} | xi r+1 x1},
increase n by 1, let qn = s/r, r = s and return to Substep (a).
4. Based on the factorization obtained in Step 3, we determine the nested set sys-
tem by considering preference 1 for which we have x1 1 x2  . . .  xqn .
First, let q′ = q/qn and let the single indexed sets be X1 = {x1, x2, . . . , xq′},
X2 = {xq′+1, xq′+2, . . . , x2q′},. . ., Xqn = {xq−q′+1, xq−q′+2, . . . , xq}. To deter-
mine the double indexed sets we have to partition the single indexed sets by tak-
ing consecutive sequences of length q/(qn−1qn) from the sequence x1, x2, . . . , xq.
We have to proceed in a similar way to obtain the remaining sets. More for-
mally, for all k = 0, . . . , n − 1 let q∗k =
∏k
l=1 ql and for all k = 1, . . . , n, all
(ik, . . . , in) ∈ ×nl=k{1, . . . , ql} let j =
(∑n
l=k(il − 1)q∗l−1
)
+ 1 and Xik,ik+1,...,in =
{xj , xj+1, . . . , xj+q∗k−1−1}.
5. It is straightforward to check whether the NERD conditions 2(a) and 3(b) are
satisfied.
6. To find appropriate bijections ϕl−1i,j : Xi,il,...,in−1,in → Xj,il,...,in−1,in that satisfy
NERD conditions 2(b) and 3(c) pick for each x ∈ Xi,il,...,in−1,in the preference
∈ P ranking x on top, then the highest ranked alternative y out of Xj,il,...,in−1,in
by , and let ϕl−1i,j (x) = y. If this cannot be done, P fails to be a minimally rich
domain, and thus, to be a CNP domain. If ϕl−1i,j is not a bijection, then P cannot
be a CNP domain. Otherwise, verify NERD conditions 2(b) and 3(c).
Clearly, only CNP domains are accepted by the above procedure. However, that any
CNP domain is accepted by the procedure is less obvious. CNP domains pass Steps
1 and 2 by Lemma 2.1. Assume that we have labeled the preferences of P according
to Step 2. We verify by induction on n in the definition of NERD that P passes
Steps 3-6. If n = 1, then P is a cyclic permutation domain, and thus, r = q by Step
3. Moreover, Step 4 determines the nested set system {X, {x1}, . . . , {xq}} associated
with cyclic permutation domains. Since P satisfies NERD, it also passes Steps 5 and
6. Assume that the procedure works well for nested set systems with n− 1 factors and
take a domain P needing n factors. Let X ′ = {X1, . . . , Xqn} be the set of the single
labeled sets from the given nested set system and assume that the sets are labeled in a
way such that X1 = {x1, . . . , xq/qn}, . . . , Xqn = {xq−q/qn+1, . . . , xq}. Define ′∈ PX′
by
X1 ′ X2 ′ . . . ′ Xqn ⇐⇒ x1 1 xq/qn+1 1 . . . 1 xq−q/qn+1,
which is well defined by Point 2 of NERD. Moreover, by Point 2 of NERD we obtain P
from Z(′), and therefore, only the alternatives from Xqn are ranked higher than x1 by
q/qn+1. Hence, Step 3 determines the last factor qn correctly. Finally, the induction
hypothesis assures that Steps 3-6 work correctly.
4 Proper Scoring Methods on CNP Domains
Definition (Scoring method) Let q be the cardinality of X, and let s : {1, ..., q} → R
satisfy s(1) ≥ s(2) ≥ ... ≥ s(q) and s(1) > s(q). The SCR fs associated with the scoring
11
method specified by s is given by
x ∈ fs(1, . . . ,n)⇔
n∑
i=1
s(rk[x,i]) ≥
n∑
i=1
s(rk[y,i]) for all y ∈ X
for all n and all 1, . . . ,n∈ PX . A scoring method is called proper if s is strictly
decreasing.
Definition (Nested Borda count) Assume that there are n given integers qk ≥ 2
for all k = 1, . . . , n such that q =
∏n
k=1 qk and n positive reals δ1, . . . , δn such that
δi+1 ≥ δiqi for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Let q∗k =
∏k
i=1 qi for all k = 0, . . . , n − 1; and let
jik,...,in =
(∑n
l=k(il − 1)q∗l−1
)
+ 1 for all k = 1, . . . , n, all (ik, . . . , in) ∈ ×nl=k{1, . . . , ql}.
We call a proper scoring method a Nested Borda count with the associated factors
q1, . . . , qn if the score function s satisfies s(ji,ik+1,...,in) − s(ji+1,ik+1,...,in) = δk for all
i = 1, . . . , qk − 1, all (ik+1, . . . , in) ∈ ×nl=k+1{1, . . . , ql} and all k = 1, . . . , n.
It can be verified that a Nested Borda count boils down to the Borda count if δi+1 = δiqi
for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1 or if n = 1. In particular, for any factorization q = ∏nk=1 qk
we obtain the score function of the Borda count if δ1 = 1 and δi+1 = δiqi for all
i = 1, . . . , n−1. Informally, the Borda count on q alternatives can be obtained through
all factorizations of q.
If one considers the nested set system consisting of sets
Xik,ik+1,...,in = {jik,ik+1,...,in , . . . , jik,ik+1,...,in + q∗k−1 − 1}
for all (ik, . . . , in) ∈ ×nl=k{1, . . . , ql} and all k = 1, . . . , n, then any positive integer
j = 1, . . . , q uniquely specifies indices i1, i2, . . . , in such that j ∈ Xik,ik+1,...,in for all
k = 1, . . . , n. Taking for all k = 1, . . . , n the Borda score functions sk(i) = qk + 1 − i
on qk alternatives, we can obtain the score function s of a Nested Borda count by
s(j) = (
∑n
k=1 δk (sk(ik)− 1)) + α, where α ∈ R. This is the reason why we refer to
the above defined class of scoring methods as Nested Borda counts.
Proposition 2 Let P be a CNP domain with associated factorization q = ∏nk=1 qk. A
proper scoring method is monotonic on P if and only if it is a Nested Borda count with
associated factors q1, . . . , qn.
Proof Since P is a CNP domain, P satisfies NERD. Thus, we can consider the corre-
sponding nested set system
{X,Xin , Xin−1,in , . . . , Xi2,...,in−1,in , Xi1,i2,...,in−1,in}qn,...,q1in=1,...,i1=1,
and let q∗k =
∏k
i=1 qi for all k = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Suppose that the proper scoring method s is not a Nested Borda count, and there-
fore, there exists a smallest k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
d1 = s(ji+1,ik+1,...,in)− s(ji,ik+1,...,in) 6= d2 = s(ji+2,ik+1,...,in)− s(ji+1,ik+1,...,in)
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , qk − 2} and (ik+1, . . . , in) ∈ ×nl=k+1{1, . . . , ql}. Take a profile Π
containing exactly one voter of each type, for instance, let Π = (1, . . . ,q). Hence,
fs(Π) = X by Lemma 2.1. By the NERD conditions we can pick two distinct sets
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Xj,ik+1,...,in−1,in and Xj′,ik+1,...,in−1,in for which there exist two sets of preferences
P1,P2 ⊆ P such that #P1 = #P2 = q∗k−1,
ji,ik+1,...,in ≤ rk[x,] < ji+1,ik+1,...,in ,
ji+1,ik+1,...,in ≤ rk[y,] < ji+2,ik+1,...,in ,
ji+1,ik+1,...,in ≤ rk[x,′] < ji+2,ik+1,...,in ,
ji+2,ik+1,...,in ≤ rk[y,′] < ji+2,ik+1,...,in + q∗k−1
for all x ∈ Xj,ik+1,...,in−1,in , all y ∈ Xj′,ik+1,...,in−1,in , all ∈ P1 and all ′∈ P2.
We construct profile Π′ from profile Π by replacing those voters’ preferences having
preferences in P2 by preferences in P1 appropriately. More specifically, if ∈ P2, then
 has to replaced with the preference ′∈ P1 satisfying
|Xj,ik+1,...,in−1,in∪Xj′,ik+1,...,in−1,in = 
′
|Xj,ik+1,...,in−1,in∪Xj′,ik+1,...,in−1,in
,
which can be done by the NERD condition. Moreover, the NERD condition guaran-
tees that profiles Π and Π′ satisfy the precondition of monotonicity at any alternative
Xj,ik+1,...,in−1,in ∪Xj′,ik+1,...,in−1,in ⊆ fs(Π). It can be verified that Xj,ik+1,...,in−1,in ∩
fs(Π) = ∅ if d1 < d2, while Xj′,ik+1,...,in−1,in ∩ fs(Π′) = ∅ if d1 > d2. Hence, mono-
tonicity is violated either at any alternative in Xj,ik+1,...,in−1,in or any alternative in
Xj′,ik+1,...,in−1,in .
Now we verify that a Nested Borda count fs with the associated factorization
q =
∏n
k=1 qk is monotonic on a CNP domain P with the same associated factorization.
We employ an induction on n. If n = 1, then P is a simple cyclic permutation domain
and fs = fB . Pick an arbitrary profile Π and any alternative x ∈ f(Π). Note that
for any cyclic permutation domain L(x,) ⊆ L(x,′) implies for any other alternative
y ∈ X \ {x} either equal rank differences in  and ′ between x and y or y  x and
x ′ y. Thus, x cannot be overtaken by other alternatives if we replace preferences in
Π with other preferences in a way that the precondition of monotonicity is satisfied.
Thus, a cyclic permutation domain has to be Borda monotonic.
Assume that any Nested Borda count with n − 1 factors is monotonic on a CNP
domain of depth n − 1 with identical factorization. Take an arbitrary Nested Borda
count fs with the associated factorization q =
∏n
k=1 qk and arbitrary CNP domain
P with the same associated factorization. We shall denote by X ′ = {X1, . . . , Xqn}
the partition required in the definition of CNP domains. By the construction of CNP
domains there are for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , qn} and i 6= j bijections ϕi,j : Xi → Xj such that
x ∈ Xi and ϕi,j(x) maintain their rank differences whenever x is ranked above ϕi,j(x).
Since the replacement mechanism assures that any alternative Xi (i = 1, . . . , qn) has
to be replaced by a CNP domain on Xi with the associated factorization
∏n−1
k=1 qk
and the restriction fs
′
of fs to q/qn alternatives (i.e., s
′ : {1, . . . , q/qn} → R such
that s′(i) = s(i) for all i = 1, . . . , q/qn) with the associated factorization
∏n−1
k=1 qk
is monotonic on P|Xi by our induction hypothesis, we can only have a violation of
monotonicity by considering two alternatives belonging to two distinct sets Xi and
Xj . Take an arbitrary profile Π such that x ∈ f(Π), where x ∈ Xi. Alternative x
can be overtaken by alternative y ∈ Xj (i 6= j) by replacing preferences in Π without
violating the precondition of monotonicity only if we can find voters of type  in Π
and a preference ′∈ P such that L(x,) ⊆ L(x,′) and either
(a) x  y, x ′ y and s (rk [x,])− s (rk [y,]) > s (rk [x,′])− s (rk [y,′]) or
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(b) y  x, y ′ x and s (rk [y,])− s (rk [x,]) < s (rk [y,′])− s (rk [x,′]).
We only consider case (a) since case (b) can be established in an analogous way. Let
x′ = ϕ−1i,j (y), d = s (rk [x
′,]) − s (rk [y,]) = s (rk [x′,′]) − s (rk [y,′]), d1 =
s (rk [x,])− s (rk [y,]) and d2 = s (rk [x,′])− s (rk [y,′]). We cannot have x  x′
and x′ ′ x, since this would violate L(x,) ⊆ L(x,′). Moreover, x′  x and x ′ x′
cannot be the case, since this would imply d1 < d < d2, which is in contradiction with
d1 > d2. The remaining two subcases x  x′ and x ′ x′, and x′  x and x′ ′ x
would imply the non-monotonicity of fs
′
on a CNP domain of depth n−1 and identical
factorization as s′ on Xi; a contradiction; which completes the proof of our proposition.
Corollary 2 Within the class of proper scoring methods only the Borda count can be
monotonic on all CNP domains.
5 Some Useful Lemmas
For the proof of the theorem, we need a series of lemmas some of which are interesting
on their own right. If there are k given preferences 1, . . . ,k∈ P and k given positive
integers n1, . . . , nk, then we shall denote by Π = (n1· 1, . . . , nk· k) a preference
profile in which the first n1 voters have preference1, the next n2 voters have preference
2 and so on.
Lemma 5.1 Suppose that P is a minimally rich domain. If there exist two distinct
preferences ,′∈ P and two alternatives x, y ∈ X satisfying rk [x,] = 1, rk [y,] =
2 and d := rk [y,′]− rk [x,′] ≥ 2, then Borda count violates monotonicity on P.
Proof of Lemma 5.1 Let ′′∈ P be a preference with top alternative y, d′ =
rk [x,′′] − rk [y,′′] and k =
⌈
2q+1
d′+1
⌉
.8 We consider the following two profiles of
k(d′+1)−1 individuals: Π = ((kd′−1)· , k· ′′) and Π′ = ((kd′−3)· , 2· ′, k· ′′).
Observe that the Borda score of y is greater than that of x by 1 in profile Π and since y
dominates the remaining alternatives we have fB(Π) = {y}. For profile Π′ the choice
of k assures9 that x and y receive higher Borda scores than any other alternative. Thus,
fB(Π′) = {x} by the assumptions imposed on  and ′. Finally, the precondition of
monotonicity for the alternative x is satisfied as we switch from Π′ to Π, but y becomes
the Borda winning alternative in Π. This completes the proof.
Lemma 5.2 If P is a Borda monotonic minimally rich domain, then for any two
preferences in P having the same top alternative the second ranked alternatives have
to be identical.
Proof of Lemma 5.2 Suppose there are preferences ,′∈ P such that rk [x,] = 1,
rk [y,] = 2, rk [x,′] = 1, rk [z,′] = 2 and y 6= z. Then rk [y,′] > 2 and Lemma
5.1 applies.
8In what follows bxc stands for the largest integer not greater than x and dxe stands for the smallest
integer not less than x.
9Any larger integer for k does the job.
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Lemma 5.3 If P is a Borda monotonic minimally rich domain, then
pi(x) = {y ∈ X | ∃ ∈ P such that rk[x,] = 1 and rk[y,] = 2}
defines a one-to-one correspondence (permutation) on X.
Proof of Lemma 5.3 The statement is obviously true in case of q ≤ 3. Therefore,
we only have to consider the case of q > 3. Suppose that x is ranked first by ∈ P
and ranked second by ′,′′∈ P. We shall denote the top alternatives of ′∈ P and
′′∈ P by y and z, respectively. Any ∗∈ P \{,′,′′} has to rank y or z lower than
x; since otherwise, y and x or z and x violate Lemma 5.1. Hence, P cannot satisfy
part (ii) of the minimal richness condition, a contradiction.
Lemma 5.4 Suppose that P is a Borda monotonic minimally rich domain. Then we
cannot find two distinct preferences ,′∈ P and an alternative y ∈ X such that
• rk [y,] > 2
• U(y,) = U(y,′),
• ∀x ∈ U(y,) : rk [x,] 6= rk [x,′].
Proof of Lemma 5.4 Suppose that there exist two distinct preferences ,′∈ P and
an alternative y ∈ X such that d = rk [y,] > 2, U(y,) = U(y,′) and rk [x,] 6=
rk [x,′] for all x ∈ U(y,). Let ′′∈ P be a preference with top alternative y and
U(y,) = {x1, . . . , xd−1}. Observe that y dominates all alternatives in X \ U(y,)
in all profiles consisting only of preferences ,′ and ′′. We define values dm =
2d− rk [xm,]− rk [xm,′] and d′m = rk [xm,′′]− 1 for all m ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1}. Now
let S = arg mins∈{1,...,d−1}
d′s
ds
and A = {xs ∈ X | s ∈ S}. For any s ∈ S it can be
verified that a profile consisting of d′s preferences of type , d′s preferences of type ′
and ds preferences of type ′′ makes alternatives {y} ∪ A indifferent on the top. Let
Π = (d′s· , d′s· ′, ds· ′′). Hence, fB(Π) = {y} ∪A.
First, if there exists an s ∈ S such that xs is ranked higher in ′ than in , then
pick an arbitrary alternative xm ∈ A achieving the highest rank increase by replacing
one voter of type  with one voter of type ′. In this case we construct Π′ from Π by
replacing one preference  with one preference ′. It can be checked that y /∈ fB(Π′),
while xm ∈ fB(Π′). Second, if for all s ∈ S we have that xs is ranked higher in
 than in ′, then pick an arbitrary alternative xm ∈ A achieving the highest rank
decrease from  to ′. In this second case we construct Π′ from Π by replacing one
preference ′ with one preference . Again, we have y /∈ fB(Π′), while xm ∈ fB(Π′).
We obtained in both cases a violation of monotonicity at y; a contradiction.
Lemma 5.5 Let P be a Borda monotonic minimally rich domain, X ′ ⊆ X and P ′ ⊆
P. Assume that q′ := #X ′ = #P ′ and that the restriction of P ′ to its top q′ alternatives
gives a CNP domain on X ′. Then for any preference ∈ P there exists a preference
′∈ P ′ such that the alternatives from X ′ must follow each other consecutively in the
same order in  as in ′.
Proof of Lemma 5.5 The restriction of P ′ to its top q′ alternatives equals P ′|X′ , which
is a CNP domain on X ′, by the assumptions of Lemma 5.5. We employ an induction
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on the depth of the CNP domain on X ′. Lemma 5.1 implies that Lemma 5.5 is satisfied
whenever P ′|X′ is a CNP domain of depth 1.
Assume that the statement holds true for any CNP domain P ′|X′ of depth less
than n. Now let P ′|X′ be a CNP domain of depth n and take the partition of X ′ into
sets X1, . . . , Xk of cardinality q
′/k according to the definition of CNP domains. Then
P ′|Xi are CNP domains of depth n − 1 for all i = 1, . . . , k. Thus, for all preferences
∈ P and all i = 1, . . . , k there exists a preference ′∈ P ′ such that the alternatives
from Xi must follow each other consecutively in the same order in  as in ′ by
our induction hypothesis. Pick an arbitrary preference ∈ P \ P ′ and suppose that
there does not exist a preference ′∈ P ′ such that the alternatives from X ′ must
follow each other consecutively in the same order in  as in ′. Let x1 be the highest
ranked X ′ alternative by . We can assume without loss of generality that x1 ∈
X1. We shall denote by ′∈ P ′ the preference ranking x1 on top. We assume for
notational convenience that ′ ranks Xi above Xi+1 for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1. Let
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} be the largest index such that the alternatives ∪j−1i=1Xi follow each other
consecutively in the same order in  as in ′. We shall denote by xj the highest
ranked Xj alternative in ′ and by ′′∈ P ′ the preference with top alternative xj .
There exists positive integers a and b such that profile Π = (a· ′, b· ′′) has xj and
U ⊆ ∪j−1i=1Xi indifferent on the top. We shall denote by u the lowest ranked alternative
from U by ′. Let d′ = rk [xj ,′]− rk [u,′] and d = rk [xj ,]− rk [u,]. We must
have d′ < d by the definition of j and our induction hypothesis. Let c =
⌈
d′
d−d′
⌉
.
We can assume that a > c, since otherwise, we can take an appropriate multiple of
a and b to have fB(Π) = {xj} ∪ U and a > c. Let Π′ = ((a− 1)· ′, b· ′′) and
Π′′ = (c· , (a− 1− c)· ′, b· ′′). If a and b were chosen large enough so that no
other alternative can interfere, then fB(Π′) = {xj} and u ∈ fB(Π′′), and therefore,
monotonicity is violated at u by switching from Π′′ to Π′.
6 Proof of the Main Result
Proof of Theorem Sufficiency follows from Proposition 2, since the Borda count is
a Nested Borda count for any factorization of q.
Thus, we just have to prove the necessity of CNP domains for which we need the
following notations. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ q = #X let |[i,j] be the restriction of
 ranging from the ith position to the jth position of , i.e., |[i,j]=|{xi,xi+1,...,xj}
where x1  · · ·  xi  · · ·  xj  · · ·  xq. In addition, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ q,
we define P[i,j] =
{|[i,j]|∈ P}. Furthermore, for any linear ordering  on X ′ ⊆ X
we define Ti() = {x ∈ X ′ | rk [x,] ≤ i}) and Mi,j() = {x ∈ X ′ | i ≤ rk [x,] ≤ j}.
We divide our proof into several steps.
Step 1: We show that P can be partitioned into subdomains having cyclic permu-
tation domains on top.
Lemma 5.3 implies that the top two alternatives determine a permutation pi of X.
The cycles of permutation pi partition X into sets X1, . . . , Xp. We shall denote by X
′
an arbitrary set Xi (i = 1, . . . , p), by x1, . . . , xm its alternatives and by k∈ P an
arbitrary preference with top alternative xk (k = 1, . . . ,m).
10 Clearly, m ≥ 2. Let
10It will turn out that the preference having xk on top is unique.
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P ′ = {1, . . . ,m}. In what follows we can assume without loss of generality that
rk [xk⊕m1,k] = 2.11
We determine the top m alternatives of P ′. We must have rk [xk⊕m2,k] = 3 for
all k = 1, . . . ,m by Lemma 5.1. Moreover, it follows from Lemma 5.1 by induction that
rk [xk⊕ml,k] = l + 1 for all l = 1, . . . ,m − 1 and all k = 1, . . . ,m. But this implies
that the top m alternatives of the preferences in P ′ follow the pattern shown in Table
9. Moreover, the restriction to its top m alternatives of any preference in P with a
Table 9: A full cycle on the top
1 2 . . . m−1 m
x1 x2 . . . xm−1 xm
x2 x3 . . . xm x1
...
...
·
·
·
...
...
xm−1 xm . . . xm−3 xm−2
xm x1 . . . xm−2 xm−1
...
...
...
...
top alternative from X ′ equals the restriction to its top m alternatives of a preference
in P ′. In addition, P ′ prescribes the possible orderings of the alternatives from X ′ by
any preference in P by Lemma 5.5.
Clearly, we are finished if p = 1. Hence, in what follows we will assume that p > 1.
Step 2: We show that if P can be partitioned into subdomains having CNP domains
on top, then a union of some of these subdomains has a deeper CNP domain on top.
Let X1, . . . , Xp be a partition of X, mi = #Xi and
Pi = {∈ P | ∃x ∈ Xi such that rk [x,] = 1}
for all i = 1, . . . , p. Assume that we have already established that Tmi() = Xi for all
∈ Pi and that P|Xi are CNP domains on Xi for all i = 1, . . . , p.
We will demonstrate in Step 2 that Borda monotonicity implies the existence of a
set of indices I ⊆ {1, . . . , p} such that #I ≥ 2 and P ′|Y is a CNP domain on Y , where
Y = ∪i∈IXi, P ′ = ∪i∈IPi and T#Y () = Y for all ∈ P ′.12
We can assume without loss of generality that m1 ≤ mi for all i = 1, . . . , p and we
simply write m for m1. Our proof of Step 2 will require three substeps.
Substep A: We show that the restriction of a subdomain of P with a CNP domain
of size m on top contains from its m+ 1th to 2mth positions another CNP domain of
the same structure. Moreover, this latter CNP domain is on top of another subdomain
of P. This “generalizes” Lemma 5.2 from alternatives to CNP subdomains.
11For two integers k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if k+ l 6= m and k+ l 6= 2m, we define k⊕m l := (k+ l) mod m,
while if k + l = m or k + l = 2m, we define k ⊕m l := m.
12This implies that mi = mj for all i, j ∈ I, that the CNP domains Pi|Xi possess the same factor-
izations mi =
∏k
j=1 qj for all i ∈ I and that the factorization associated with P ′|Y is
(∏k
j=1 qj
)
·#I.
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We claim that there exists an i ∈ {2, . . . , p} such that P1|X1 and Pi|Xi have identical
associated factorizations, and furthermore, Mm+1,2m() = Xi for all ∈ P1. In ad-
dition, there exists a bijection ϕ1,i : X1 → Xi such that x ∈ X1 and ϕ1,i(x) maintain
their rank differences in P1. The claim of Substep A implies by Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5
that P1|Xi = Pi|Xi and m1 = #P1|X1 = #P1|X1∪Xi . We prove our claim by induction.
Initial step of Substep A: We consider a subdomain P ′ of P1 with a cyclic
permutation domain on top. Note that P ′ = P1 if P1|X1 is a CNP domain of depth 1.
It follows from Lemma 5.4 that there cannot be an alternative x ∈ X that is ranked
by two distinct preferences  and ′ in P ′ at the m + 1th position. We shall denote
the n distinct alternatives ranked mth by the preferences in P ′ by y1, . . . , yn ∈ X,
the corresponding preferences by 1, . . . ,n and the corresponding top alternatives by
z1, . . . , zn, respectively. Let Y = {y1, . . . , yn} and Z = {z1, . . . , zn}. We can assume
without loss of generality that P ′|Z = Z(∗), where z1 ∗ z2 ∗ . . . ∗ zn.
We show that rk [yk⊕n1,k] = m + 2 for all k = 1, . . . n. This assures by Lemma
5.5 that the preferences in P ′ look like in Table 10. For notational convenience we
Table 10: Substep A
1 2 . . . n−1 n
z1 z2 . . . zn−1 zn
z2 z3 . . . zn z1
...
...
·
·
·
...
...
...
zn−1 zn . . . zn−3 zn−2
zn z1 . . . zn−2 zn−1
...
...
...
...
y1 y2 . . . yn−1 yn
y2 y3 . . . yn y1
...
...
·
·
·
...
...
...
yn−1 yn . . . yn−3 yn−2
yn y1 . . . yn−2 yn−1
...
...
...
...
will only show that rk [y2,1] = m + 2. We shall denote by ′ a preference with top
alternative y2. Arguing in an even simpler way than in Lemma 5.4, we can find positive
integers a and b such that y2 together with at least another alternative from set X1
receive the highest Borda scores in profile Π = (a· 2, b· ′) and the lead of y2 over the
alternatives from X1 \fB(Π) is at least m. Let U ⊆ X1 be the set of those alternatives
that are ranked higher by 1 than by 2.13
Suppose that fB(Π) ∩U 6= ∅. Pick arbitrary alternative u ∈ fB(Π) ∩U 6= ∅. Then
13From the structure of P1|X1 it follows that rk [u,2] − rk [u,1] = n − 1 for any u ∈ U and
rk [x,1]− rk [x,2] = 1 for any x ∈ X1 \ U .
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there exists a k ∈ {1, . . . ,m/n} such that rk [u,2] = kn. We shall denote by v ∈ X1
the (k − 1)n + 1th ranked alternative by 2.14 Let d = rk [y2,2] − rk [u,2] and
d′ = rk [u,′]− rk [y2,′]. Since u, y2 ∈ fB(Π), we must have ad = bd′, u ′ v and by
Lemma 5.5 rk [v,′] = d′ + 2. Let us compare the Borda score of v with that of u in
Π. On the one hand v receives a(n − 1) points more than u and on the other hand u
receives b points more than v. Therefore, we must have
a(n− 1) ≤ b⇔ a(n− 1) ≤ a d
d′
⇔ d′(n− 1) ≤ d;
a contradiction, since d < m ≤ d′ and n ≥ 2 by the Assumptions of Step 2. Thus,
fB(Π) ∩ U = ∅.
Let z be the highest ranked alternative from fB(Π) \ {y2} by ′, δ = rk [y2,1]−
rk [y1,1], d = rk [y2,2] − rk [z,2] and d′ = rk [z,′] − rk [y2,′]. Observe that
z has to be the lowest ranked alternative in 2 from set fB(Π) \ {y2}. Suppose that
δ ≥ 2, which would mean that y2 does not follow immediately y1 in 1. We have to
incorporate at least one voter of type1 appropriately in order to obtain a contradiction
with δ ≥ 2. First, we omit a voter of type 2, which makes y2 the single Borda winner
with a lead of d over z. Second, we compensate this lead by replacing c =
⌈
d
δ−1
⌉
voters of type 2 with voters of type 1. If a ≤ c, then by taking an appropriate
multiple of Π, we can ensure that we have more voters of type 2 than c. Hence, we
can assume a > c without loss of generality. Third, we have to take care about not
making an alternative u ∈ U the Borda winning alternative. If z does not lead by cn
over alternatives u ∈ U in Π, then this can be guaranteed by starting already with an
appropriate multiple of Π.15 Again, we can assume without loss of generality that a
and b satisfy this latter requirement. Finally, let Π′ = (c· 1, (a − c − 1)· 2, b· ′)
and Π′′ = ((a− 1)· 2, b· ′). It can be verified that monotonicity is violated at z by
switching from Π′ to Π′′, since z ∈ fB(Π′) and {y2} = fB(Π′′). Thus, we must have
δ = 1.
Induction hypotheses of Substep A: Assume that we have already obtained
a partition P1,1, . . . ,P1,t of P1, disjoint subdomains P2,1, . . . ,P2,t ⊆ P \ P1 with
respective top n = mt alternatives X
j,i (j = 1, 2 and i = 1, . . . , t) such that t ≥ 2, n =
#P1,i[1,n] = #P2,i[1,n], P1,i[m+1,m+n] = P2,i[1,n] are CNP domains with associated factorizations
n = q1·. . .·ql for all i = 1, . . . , t and there exist bijections ϕ : X1,i → X2,i satisfying that
x and ϕi(x) maintain their rank differences in P1,i for all x ∈ X1,i and all i = 1, . . . , t.16
This implies that the factorization associated with P1 equals q1 · . . . ·ql · . . . ·ql′ for some
l′ and ql+1, . . . , ql′ .
Induction step of Substep A: Let r = ql+1, h = t/r and Pj,i = {j,i1 , . . . ,j,in }
for all j = 1, 2 and all i = 1, . . . , t. We shall denote by Xj,i the set of top alternatives of
Pj,i. If we have labeled the sets X1,i appropriately, then the first r subdomains of P1|X1
look like in Table 11. In what follows we shall focus, for notational convenience, on P1,1
and P1,2. In addition, we can assume without loss of generality that the alternatives
and preferences are labeled in a way that rk
[
x1,in ,1,2k
]
= (i − 2)n + 1 + (n − k) for
14Observe that rk [u,1] = (k − 1)n+ 1 and rk [v,1] = (k − 1)n+ 2.
15More precisely, we should have first defined c =
⌈
d
δ−1
⌉
and a, b afterwards. However, we have
followed a different order for expositional reasons.
16Our initial step assured the existence of a partition with l = 1.
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Table 11: Subdomain on top
P1,1 P1,2 . . . P1,r
X1,1 X1,2 . . . X1,r
X1,2 X1,3 . . . X1,1
...
...
...
X1,r X1,1 . . . X1,r−1
...
...
...
X1,t−r+1 X1,t−r+2 . . . X1,t
X1,t−r+2 X1,t−r+3 . . . X1,t−r+1
...
...
...
X1,t X1,t−r+1 . . . X1,t−1
...
...
...
all k = 1, . . . , n and all i = 2, . . . , t for which i− 1 is not divisible by r, and otherwise,
rk
[
x1,in ,1,2k
]
= (i+ r − 2)n+ 1 + (n− k) for all k = 1, . . . , n and all i = 1, . . . , t.
We shall denote by y1, . . . , yn the n distinct alternatives ranked m + 1th by the
preferences 1,21 , . . . ,1,2n , respectively. Let Y = {y1, . . . , yn}. Moreover, for all i =
1, . . . , n we simply write i, ′i and ′′i for 1,1i , 1,2i and 2,2i , respectively.
We can find positive integers a and b such that Y and at least a set of alternatives
X ′ ⊆ X1 receives the highest Borda score in profile Π = (a· ′1, . . . , a· ′n, b· ′′1
, . . . , b· ′′n). Let U ⊆ X1 be the set of those alternatives that are ranked higher by 1
than by ′1. Observe that U = ∪h−1i=0X1,ir+1.
Suppose that there exists an i = 1, . . . , h such that u ∈ fB(Π)∩X1,(i−1)r+1. Pick an
arbitrary alternative y ∈ Y . Since {u, y} ∈ fB(Π), we must have a[(h−i)r+1]n2 = bd′,
where d′ =
∑n
i=1 rk [u,′′i ] − rk [y,′′i ]. Take an alternative v from X1,(i−1)r+2 such
that d′′ =
∑n
i=1 rk [v,′′i ] − rk [y,′′i ] is as small as possible. Since the Borda score
of v cannot be greater than that of u in Π, we must have an(r − 1)n ≤ b (d′′ − d′).
Therefore,
bd′
[(h− i)r + 1]n2n
2(r − 1) ≤ b (d′′ − d′)⇔ d′(r − 1) ≤ (d′′ − d′) [(h− i)r + 1]. (6.1)
By the hypothesis of Step 2 and by Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 we must have d′ ≥ mn = tn2.
The value d′′−d′ would be the largest if u is ranked higher than v by any preference ′′i ∈
P2,2. Then the alternatives from X1,(i−1)r+2 must follow immediately the alternatives
from X1,(i−1)r+1 in any ′′i ∈ P2,2 by Lemma 5.5. Moreover, we have d′′ − d′ ≤ n2 by
Lemma 5.5 and by the choice of v, which together with equation (6.1) implies
tn2 ≤ d′(r − 1) ≤ (d′′ − d′) [(h− i)r + 1] ≤ n2[(h− i)r + 1].
It follows from these inequalities that rh = t ≤ [(h − i)r + 1], which implies ir ≤ 1.
Therefore, since r, n ≥ 2, h ≥ 1 and i ≥ 1 we obtained a contradiction and we conclude
that fB(Π) ∩ U = ∅.
Define v = max{i = 1, . . . , t | X1,i ∩ fB(Π) 6= ∅} and pick an alternative z from
X1,v ∩ fB(Π). Let ′∈ P1,2 the preference that ranks z highest. For notational
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convenience we can assume that ′=′n and ′ ranks yn as the highest alternative from
Y .17 Hence, z is the highest ranked alternative from X1,v by ′n. Observe that from the
way how we labeled the alternatives of X1 and our assumption on ϕ : X
1,2 → X2,2 = Y
it follows that rk [yn,′k]− rk
[
x1,2n ,′k
]
= m for all k = 1, . . . , n. In addition, we can
assume for notational convenience that k|X1,v=′k|X1,v for all k = 1, . . . , n. We will
show that rk [yn,k] = m + n + 1 + (n − k) for all k = 1, . . . , n. Observe that
rk [yn,k] > m + n, since the shortest sequence of alternatives that must follow an
already prescribed order is of length n and by Lemma 5.4 none of the alternatives
of Y can be ranked m + 1th by a preference of P1,1. Now take an arbitrary index
k = 1, . . . , n and let δk = rk [yn,k]− (m+ 1 + n− k).
Suppose that δk > n. By replacing a preference ′1 with ′n in Π, we can achieve
that fB(Π) contains only yn from Y and only z from X
1,v. In what follows we shall
denote this modified profile by Π with a slight abuse of notation. Let d = rk [yn,′n]−
rk [z,′n] and d′ =
∑n
i=1 rk [z,′′i ]−rk [yn,′′i ]. Note that d′ ≥ mn by the assumptions
of Step 2 and by Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5. Now we have to incorporate at least one voter of
type k into Π in order to obtain a contradiction with δk > n. First, we omit a voter
of type ′1, which makes yn the single Borda winner with a lead of d over z. Second,
we compensate this lead by replacing c =
⌈
d
δk−n
⌉
voters of type ′k with voters of
type k. If a ≤ c, then by starting with an appropriate multiple of Π, we can ensure
that we have more than c voters of type ′k. Hence, we can assume a > c without
loss of generality. Third, we have to take care about not making an alternative u ∈ U
the Borda winning alternative. If z does not lead by cm over alternatives u ∈ U in
Π, then this can be guaranteed by starting already with an appropriate multiple of
Π.18 Thus, we can assume without loss of generality that a and b satisfy this latter
requirement. Let Π′ = ((a − 2)· ′1, a· ′2, . . . , a· ′k−1, c· k, (a − c)· ′k, a· ′k+1
, . . . , a· ′n−1, (a + 1)· ′n, b· ′′1 , . . . , b· ′′n) and Π′′ = ((a − 2)· ′1, a· ′2, . . . , a· ′n−1
, (a+ 1)· ′n, b· ′′1 , . . . , b· ′′n). It can be verified that monotonicity is violated at z by
switching from Π′ to Π′′, since {z} = fB(Π′) and {yn} = fB(Π′′). Thus, we cannot
have δk > n.
Suppose that δk < n for some k. Then alternative yn has to be ranked by at least
two different preferences of P1,1 at the same position, since δk ≤ n for all i = 1, . . . , n.
However, this is in contradiction with Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5. Hence, we must have δk = n
for all k = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, since the shortest sequence of alternatives that must follow an already
prescribed order is of length n and by Lemma 5.5 none of the alternatives of Y can
be ranked m + 1th by a preference of P1,1, we obtained that n = #P1,2|X1∪Y and
P1,1[m+n+1,m+2n] = P2,2[1,n]. Thus, the domain of Table 11 extends to a domain as illus-
trated in Table 12. Now Lemma 5.5 implies that the alternatives ∪ri=1Yi must form a
CNP domain of depth l + 1 with an associated factorization
∏l+1
i=1 qi. Therefore, our
induction works and the induction hypothesis is true for depth l + 1. Arriving to l′,
we see that the claim of Substep A is true, since it follows from Lemma 5.5 that there
exists an i = 2, . . . , p for which P2,1, . . . ,P2,t partitions Pi.
Substep B: We “generalize” Lemma 5.3 from alternatives to CNP subdomains on
17Otherwise, we would relabel the alternatives of X1 and Y as well as the preferences of P1,2.
18More precisely, we should have first defined c =
⌈
d
δk−n
⌉
and a, b afterwards. Again, we have
followed a different order for expositional reasons.
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Table 12: Extended domain
P1,1 P1,2 . . . P1,r
X1,1 X1,2 . . . X1,r
X1,2 X1,3 . . . X1,1
...
...
...
X1,r X1,1 . . . X1,r−1
...
...
...
X1,t−r+1 X1,t−r+2 . . . X1,t
X1,t−r+2 X1,t−r+3 . . . X1,t−r+1
...
...
...
X1,t X1,t−r+1 . . . X1,t−1
Y1 Y2 . . . Yr
Y2 Y3 . . . Y1
...
...
...
top. Informally, we show that subdomains with two consecutive CNP domains on top
form cycles of CNP domains on top.
Substep A implies that there exists an I ⊆ {1, . . . , p} such that for all i ∈ I the
subdomains Pi|Xi have all identical factorizations, there exists a j ∈ I \ {i} for which
Mm+1,2m() = Xj for all ∈ Pi and there exists a bijection ϕi,j : Xi → Xj such that
x ∈ Xi and ϕi,j(x) maintain their rank differences in Pi. We shall assume for notational
convenience that I = {1, . . . , r}. Hence, there exists a σ : {1, . . . , r} → {1, . . . , r} telling
us, which set Xσ(i) of alternatives must follow immediately the top set Xi of alternatives
for all i = 1, . . . , r. In Substep B we demonstrate that σ is a bijection. This is clearly
the case if r = 2.
Thus, we can assume that r > 2. Our proof will be similar to that of Lemmas
5.1-5.3, but we have to replace the alternatives appearing in those proofs with “nested
cycles”, which will complicate the argument.
Suppose that σ does not define a bijection. Then there exists i, i′, i′′ ∈ {1, . . . r}
such that i 6= i′, i 6= i′′, i′ 6= i′′, σ(i′) = i and σ(i′′) = i. Moreover, m = mi =
mi′ = mi′′ by Substep A. For notational convenience let X
′ = {x1, . . . , xm} = Xi, Y =
{y1, . . . , ym} = Xi′ , Z = {z1, . . . , zm} = Xi′′ such that ϕi′,i(yl) = xl and ϕi′′,i(zl) = xl
for all l = 1, . . . ,m. Pick preferences 1, . . . ,m,′1, . . . ,′m,′′1 , . . . ,′′m∈ P with
respective top alternatives x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , ym, z1, . . . , zm. If r = 3, then the alter-
natives from X ′ cannot be lowest ranked alternatives; a contradiction. If r > 3, then
we can assume the existence of a preference ∈ P in which the alternatives from Y are
ranked above the alternatives from Z and the alternatives from Z are ranked above
the alternatives from X ′ by part (ii) of the minimal richness condition. For notational
convenience we can assume that
yl ′l . . . ′l yl′ ′l x1 ′l . . . ′l xm ′l . . .
zk ′′k . . . ′′k zk′ ′′k x1 ′′k . . . ′′k xm ′′k . . .
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and
. . .  ys  . . .  ys′  . . .  zt  . . .  zt′  . . .  x1  . . .  xm
for some l, l′, k, k′, s, s′, t, t′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Let J = arg minj∈{1,...,m}
∑m
u=1 rk [yj ,u] and Y ′ = {yj ∈ Y | j ∈ J}. Then there
exist positive integers a and b such that b > m2 + 1 and that profile
Π = (a· 1, . . . , a· m, b· ′1, . . . , b· ′m) ,
has alternatives Y ′ ∪X ′ indifferent on top with a lead of at least (m2 + 1)q over the
alternatives from X \ (X ′ ∪ Y ). We consider profile
Π′ = (a· 1, . . . , a· m, (b− 1)· ′1, . . . , (b− 1)· ′m) ,
in which the top alternatives X ′ have a lead of m2 over alternatives Y ′. To obtain Π′′
from Π′ we replace m2 + 1 preferences of type ′s with m2 + 1 preferences of type .
It can be verified that fB(Π′) = X ′ and fB(Π′′) = Y ′. Thus, we have a violation of
monotonicity at any alternative y ∈ Y ′ if we switch from Π′′ to Π′.
Substep C: What Step 1 showed for alternatives is now established for subdomains
with CNP domains on top: the union of some subdomains with CNP domains of
identical factorization on top form a subdomain with a deeper CNP domain on top,
which completes the proof of Step 2.
Substep B established that the cycles of permutation σ partition {1, . . . , r} into
sets I1, . . . , Is. In what follows we consider, for notational convenience, the case of
I = I1 = {1, . . . , k} and σ(1) = 2, . . . , σ(k − 1) = k, σ(k) = 1. First, in an analogous
way to Step 1 we show in Substep C that the cycles formed by alternatives X1, . . . , Xk
follow each other in a cyclic pattern in P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk; that is, for all i = 1, . . . , k we
have in Pi that the alternatives from Xi⊕k1 follow those from Xi, the alternatives from
Xi⊕k2 follow those from Xi⊕k1, and so on. Second, we claim that there exist bijections
τi,j : Xi → Xj (i, j = 1, . . . , k) such that
[x ∈ Xi, v = τi,j(x), x  v, x ′ v]⇒ rk [v,]− rk [x,] = rk [v,′]− rk [x,′] (6.2)
for all ,′∈ P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk and all i 6= j, i, j = 1, . . . , k.
Clearly, both claims are true for the case of k ≤ 2. Hence, we can assume that
k ≥ 3. We know by Substep B that the first claim of Substep C is true for the top 2m
alternatives of any preferences in Pi and that we can define bijections τi,i⊕k1 : Xi →
Xi⊕k1 in a way that equation (6.2) holds true for all i = 1, . . . , k if we restrict ourselves
to the top 2m alternatives of P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk.
Our induction hypotheses is that the claim holds true for the top lm alternatives,
where l ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, of any preference in P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk.19 For purely notational
convenience let Y = {y1, . . . , ym} = Xl, Z = {z1, . . . , zm} = Xl+1, and τl,l+1(yi) = zi
for all i = 1, . . . ,m. We will just consider the case of z1. The other elements of Z
can be handled in the same way. We shall denote by ∈ P1 the preference that ranks
y1 as the highest ranked Y alternative; i.e., rk [y1,] = m(l − 1) + 1. Moreover, let
′ be a preference ranking y1 on the top and let ′′ be a preference ranking z1 on
19This includes that we have defined bijections τi,i⊕kl−1 : Xi → Xi⊕kl−1 in a way that equation
(6.2) holds true for all i = 1, . . . , k if we restrict ourselves to the top lm alternatives of P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk.
23
the top. There exists positive integers a and b such that profile Π = (a· ′, b· ′′) has
alternatives z1 and Y
′ ⊆ Y on the top. Let ys = max{t ∈ {1, . . . ,m} | yt ∈ Y ′}.
Suppose that alternative z1 does not immediately follow ym in ; i.e, rk [z1,] >
ml + 1. Let δ = rk [z1,] − (ml + 1), d = rk [z1,′] − rk [ys,′] and c =
⌈
d
δ
⌉
. Then
considering profiles Π′ = ((a− 1)· ′, b· ′′) and Π′′ = (c· , (a− c− 1)· ′, b· ′′), we
can verify that ys ∈ fB(Π′′) and fB(Π′) = {z1} if a and b were selected large enough
so that no other alternative can interfere and a > c+ 1. Monotonicity is now violated
at ys if we switch from Π
′′ to Π′.
It follows from the above defined τl,l+1 : Xl → Xl+1, τ1,l : X1 → Xl and transitivity
that we obtained a bijection τ1,l+1 : X1 → Xl+1 in a way that equation (6.2) holds
true for all l = 1, . . . , k − 1 if we restrict ourselves to the top (l + 1)m alternatives of
P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk. One can obtain the remaining bijections in an analogous way.
We conclude that we have constructed the required sets Y = ∪ki=1Xi and P ′ =
∪ki=1Pi by induction.
Step 3: The partition X1, . . . , Xp of X in Step 1 satisfies the requirements of Step
2. Finally, it follows by induction from Step 2 that P has to be a CNP domain.
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